Don't bet on one math.

Three unrelated signature schemes guard one identity. Any two sign. Break a stage: the other two hold.

KANTUM · DWG KT-001 · REV C
SCALE 1:8 · SHEET 1/1 · DIM IN mm
DRAG TO TURN · CLICK A STAGE

Don't bet on one signal.

Paste any Solana coin. Three independent checks look at the contract, the holders and the market. Two must pass.

On Solana your address is your public key. Paste it and see, on a scale of 100, what a quantum computer could reach behind it.

Every new coin, the second it appears. For each one: what its creator bought, and how much of the supply was grabbed in the very first block. Click a coin for the full check.

Same rule, on autopilot. This bot watches every trending Solana coin: is the price climbing, are people buying, and a quantum coin flip. Two out of three, or no trade. It never buys a coin that fails the check above.

Same rule, applied to wallets: three kinds of math guard one identity, any two sign. Behind this page there is a live quantum attack simulator, an on-chain registry and a terminal.

Paste a Solana coin, or type check ADDRESS in the terminal. Every claim comes with the wallet or the transaction that proves it.


          

P(c,d) after QFT†
64 × 64 outcomes
bright = likely
□ = measured shot

the stripes are the private key:
d ≡ k·c (mod 31)

waiting for first run…

sourceyearlogical qToffoliphysical qtime
Roetteler+20172,3301.3e11——
Litinski2023—5.0e7——
Chevignard+20261,1935.4e11 ×22——
Google QAI2026<1,200<9.0e7<500,000minutes
IonQ20261,457~3.9e719,397~26 days
ECDSA.Fail*20261,1511.3e6——
this tab (toy sim)now1772 gates0~20 ms

Estimates for secp256k1 / P-256. ed25519 is the same size class. No 256-bit key has been broken. * one point addition, not the whole attack.

|ψ₁⟩ = 2⁻ⁿ Σₐ Σ_b |a⟩|b⟩|aG + bQ⟩
QFT_N|x⟩ = N^-½ Σ_y e^(2πi·xy/N)|y⟩
peaks: d ≡ k·c (mod r) ⇒ k = d·c⁻¹
A = SHA-256("KANTUM/v1/id" ‖ pk_E ‖ pk_F ‖ pk_S)
Falcon-512: s₁ + s₂·h ≡ H(r‖m) (mod 12289), ‖(s₁,s₂)‖² ≤ β²
SLH-DSA-128f: n=16 h=66 d=22 k=33 a=6 w=16
ML-KEM-768: k=3 n=256 q=3329
shard_x = s ⊕ a·x over GF(2⁸), x ∈ {1,2,3}
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